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DULDULAO v. ST. MARY OF NAZARETH
HOSPITAL CENTER:* ILLINOIS RECOGNIZES
HANDBOOK EXCEPTION TO AT WILL
EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP
The at will employment doctrine creates a presumption that an
employer may terminate an employee hired for an indefinite duration at any time, with or without cause.' This presumption may be
115 Ill. 2d 482, 505 N.E.2d 314 (1987).
1. The employment at will doctrine was derived from the common law principles of master and servant. See W. HOLLOWAY & M. LEECH, EMPLOYMENT TERMINA*

TION RIGHTS AND REMEDIES 3-42 (1985) (discussion of the history of the at will employment doctrine); H. PERRITT, EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL LAW AND PRACTICE § 1.3 (1984

& Supp. 1986) (development of at will rule); S. Abbasi, K. Hollman & J. Murrey,
Employment at Will: An Eroding Concept in Employment Relationships, 38 LAB.
L.J. 21, 22-24 (1987) (historical overview of at will doctrine and exceptions); Blades,
Employment At Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of
Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404, 1416-19 (1967) (traditional at will rule and
its foundation); De Giuseppe, The Effect of the Employment at Will Rule on Employee Rights to Job Security and Fringe Benefits, 10 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1, 3-10
(1981) (in-depth explanation of the doctrine); Lawless, Wrongful Discharge: The Employer's Duty of Good Faith, 18 TRIAL 54, 55-57 (Dec. 1982) (discussion of the at will
doctrine); Note, Employment at Will-The Implied ContractLimitation in ArizonaLeikvold v. Valley View Community Hospital, 141 Ariz. 544, 688 P.2d 170 (1984) 1985
ARiz. ST. L.J. 783, 785-90 (legal background of master-servant relationship); Note,
Survey of New York Practice,57 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 615, 641 n.112 (1983) (comparing
English common law employment relationships to present employment relationships);
Note, The Employment Handbook as a ContractualLimitation on the Employment
At Will Doctrine, 31 VILL. L. REV. 335, 337-41 (1986) (background of the at will doctrine and its subsequent restrictions). English common law regarded an indefinite hiring to be a hiring for one year. See Davis v. Gorton, 16 N.Y. 255 (1857). Most American jurisdictions adhered to the British common law rule until the middle of the 19th
century. Isbell-Sirotkin, Defending the Abusively DischargedEmployee: In Search of
a Judicial Solution, 12 N.M.L. REV. 711, 713 (1982). At that time, the laissez faire
economic and governmental policies that favored self-reliance and economic individualism were developing. Note, Protecting At Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 HAv. L. REV. 1816, 1826
(1980); Note, A Common Law Action for the Abusively Discharged Employee, 26
HASTINGS L.J. 1435, 1441 (1975) (at will doctrine reflected philosophy of laissez faire).
As a result of the increased emphasis on self-reliance, fewer commitments between
employers and employees existed. See M. Witmark & Sons v. Fred Fischer Music Co.,
125 F.2d 949 (2d Cir. 1942) (Frank, J., dissenting), aff'd, 318 U.S. 643 (1943) ("men
should have the greatest possible liberty to make such contracts as they please"). Id.
at 962. Accordingly, American courts abandoned the English one-year concept for a
view that provides that hirings for an indefinite period are presumed to be terminable
at the will of either party. See Feinman, The Development of the Employment at
Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 118, 125-27 (1976). This view became known as the
at will doctrine. Id.
The at will doctrine was attributed to a treatise on master and servant relationships by H.G. Wood. Commentator Wood, in articulating the doctrine, stated:
With us the rule is inflexible that a general or indefinite hiring is prima facie a
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rebutted, however, with evidence indicating that the parties contracted otherwise.2 Under certain circumstances, an employee handbook may constitute such evidence. s In Duldulao v. Saint Mary of
Nazareth Hospital Center,' the Illinois Supreme Court addressed
the issue of whether an employee handbook may create enforceable
contract rights for at will employees. 5 Finding the traditional requirements for contract formations present, the court concluded
that an employee handbook containing specific grounds for discharge can modify an otherwise at will employment relationship.7
The effects of the Duldulao ruling may be limited, however, when
hiring at will, and if the servant seeks to make it out a yearly hiring, the burden is on him to establish it by proof. A hiring at so much a day, week, month
or year, no time being specified, is an indefinite hiring, and no presumption
attaches that it was a day even, but only at the rate fixed for whatever the
party may serve.
H.G. WooD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT 1, 265 (1877). For a
modern view of the at will doctrine, see Annotation, Modern Status of Rule that
Employer May Discharge At Will Employee for Any Reason, 12 A.L.R. 4th 544
(1982). The Restatement of Agency refers to the at will employment doctrine as follows: "Unless otherwise agreed mutual promises by principal and agent to employ
and to serve create obligations to employ and to serve which are terminable upon
notice by either party; if neither party terminates the employment, it may terminate
by lapse of time or by supervening event." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 442
(1958).
The employment at will doctrine is currently in transition. See generally Note,
Employee Handbooks and Employment-At-Will Contracts, 1985 DUKE L.J. 196, 205
[hereinafter Note, Employee Handbooks]; Note, Herbster v. North Am. Co. for Life
& Health Ins.: Attorney's Retaliatory Discharge Action Unjustly Dismissed, 21 J.
MARSHALL L. REv. 215 (1987). Recently, courts have departed from a strict adherence
of the at will doctrine. See Blades, supra note 1, at 1408-13 (author attributes erosion
of doctrine to technological, economic, and sociological changes); Heshizer, The New
Common Law of Employment: Changes in the Concept of Employment at Will, 36
LAB. L.J. 95, 97-98 (1985) (recognizing that traditional rationale for doctrine is lacking); Mauk, Wrongful Discharge:The Erosion of 100 Years of Employer Privilege, 21
IDAHO L. REV. 201, 204 (1985)(citing 1982 ABA report acknowledging departure). Cf.
Carley, At-Will Employees Still Vulnerable, 73 A.B.A.J. 66 (1987) ("at-will doctrine
is alive and well"). But see Decker, Handbooks and Employment Policies Express or
Implied Guaranteesof Employment-Employer Beware!, 5 J.L. & CoM. 207, 208-09
n.3 (lengthy compilation of articles written with criticism of doctrine).
2. Courts, recognizing that the at will presumption may be overcome with evidence indicating that the parties contracted otherwise, treat the doctrine as a rule of
construction. Note, Reforming At Will Employment Law: A Model Statute, 16 U.
MICH. J.L. REF. 370, 391 (1983) [hereinafter Reforming At Will Employment]. More
than 2/3 of American jurisdictions interpret the doctrine as a rule of construction
rather than as an absolute bar to contractual enforceability. PERRITT, supra note 1, §
1.11 (Supp. 1986). For a further discussion of the at will doctrine as a rule of construction, see infra note 38 and accompanying text.
3. See Mullins, Employers' right to fire employees disappearing, Chi. D.L.
Bull., June 4, 1987, at 2 (employer rights limited by own handbook). See also infra
note 59 for a list of jurisdictions accepting the view that handbooks may rebut the at
will presumption.
4. 115 11. 2d 482, 505 N.E.2d 314 (1987).
5. Id.
6. The traditional requirements for contract formation include offer, acceptance

and consideration. See E.
7.

FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS

§ 3.3 (1982).

Duldulao, 115 Il1. 2d at 490, 505 N.E.2d at 318.
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Duldulao v. St. Mary of Nazareth Hospital

an employer includes a disclaimer to negate the promises made in
the handbook.8
In 1970, Nora E. Duldulao began working9 at the Saint Mary of
Nazareth Hospital Center ("Hospital") as a nurse.'" Two years later,
she was promoted to staff development coordinator." Duldulao was
hired indefinitely and never received a written employment contract." In 1975, the Hospital issued Duldulao an employee handbook.' s The handbook stated that in the absence of a serious offense," a non-probationary employee" could only be discharged in
8. Id. at 491, 505 N.E.2d at 319. For a discussion of the employer's ability to
include disclaimers in order to avoid liability for handbooks, see infra notes 84-89
and accompanying text.
9. Duldulao, 115 Ill. 2d at 484, 505 N.E.2d at 315. Duldulao was initially hired
in 1968, and left her job at the Hospital for a trip to the Phillipines. Id.
10. Id. Saint Mary of Nazareth Hospital Center is a 490 bed acute care general
hospital in Chicago, Illinois. Brief for Appellee at 2, Duldulao v. Saint Mary of Nazareth Hosp., 115 Ill. 2d 482, 505 N.E.2d 314 (1987) (No. 84-2554).
11. Duldulao, 115 Ill. 2d at 484, 505 N.E.2d at 315. Duldulao retained her position as staff development coordinator until September 14, 1981. Id. At that time, the
Hospital reorganized several departments and Duldulao became the human resources
coordinator. Id. Duldulao claimed that her new position was identical to her previous
position. Id. The Hospital, however, contended that Duldulao's new position included
new duties and responsibilities. Id. at 484-85, 505 N.E.2d at 315.
12. Duldulao originally alleged that she entered into an employment contract
with the Hospital on April 20, 1970. Brief for Appellee at 2, Duldulao, 115 Ill. 2d 482,
505 N.E.2d 314. (No. 84-2554). Duldulao later admitted, however, that she did not
enter into a written contract and she was hired for an indefinite duration. Id.
13. Duldulao, 115 Ill. 2d at 485, 505 N.E.2d at 316. The Hospital first published
an employee handbook in 1970. Id. Duldulao, however, did not receive a handbook
until the Hospital revised the handbooks in 1975. Id. The revised handbook contained a provision for the dismissal of non-probationary employees. Id. at 486, 505
N.E.2d at 316. That provision stated in part: "[Plermanent employees are never dismissed without prior written warnings and admonitions and/or investigations that
have been properly documented . . . and three warning notices within a twelvemonth period are required before an employee is dismissed, except in the case of
immediate dismissal." Id. (emphasis added). See infra note 14 for a discussion of
grounds that will constitute immediate dismissal.
14. The handbook contained a list of serious offenses that included mistreating
a patient, fighting on hospital premises, unauthorized possession of weapons, and reporting to work under the influence of intoxicants. See Duldulao, 115 Ill. 2d at 491,
505 N.E.2d at 318.
15. The handbook contained a provision that stated: "[A]t the end of 90 calendar days since employment, the employee becomes a permanent employee". Id. at
490-91, 505 N.E.2d at 318. Thus, a non-probationary employee is someone who has
been employed at the Hospital for more than 90 days. At the time of Duldulao's
dismissal, she had been employed by the Hospital for over 11 years. Id. Duldulao,
therefore, had completed her probationary period and was a permanent employee at
the time of her termination. The Hospital, however, contended that when Duldulao
was transferred to her new position she reverted to probationary status. Id. at 493,
505 N.E.2d at 319.
The court disagreed with the Hospital and found nothing in the handbook indicating that an employee may lose the right to progressive discipline policies that had
vested after the initial probationary period. Id. See also infra note 16 for a discussion
of the progressive discipline policy. Furthermore, because Duldulao was receiving all
of the benefits of a permanent employee, the court rejected the Hospital's contention
that Duldulao was a probationary employee. Duldulao, 115 Ill. 2d at 493, 505 N.E.2d
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accordance with a progressive discipline policy.' 6 Contrary to the
progressive discipline policy, Duldulao was fired without notice on
December 11, 1981.1' Consequently, Duldulao sued the Hospital, asserting that the provisions of the handbook created an implied contract which the Hospital subsequently breached."8
The trial court denied Duldulao's motion for summary judgment and entered judgment in favor of the Hospital. 9 The court
held that the statements made in the handbook did not rise to the
level of contractual obligations.2 Moreover, the court found that
at 319.
16. Id. at 491, 505 N.E.2d at 318. As to the disciplinary action, the handbook
issued to Duldulao by the Hospital stated:
DISCIPLINARY ACTION
Certain types of action or behavior on the part of an employee are considered unacceptable. Although a single instance in itself is not considered
grounds for dismissal, repeated instances can lead to discharge. Saint Mary of
Nazareth Hospital Center uses the following types of disciplinary action:
Admonishment
A formal warning in writing which clearly specifies the nature of the
infraction.
Reprimand
A formal warning in writing given for a repeated infraction of the rules.
The nature of the infraction must be clearly stated and the date of the admonition must also be given.
Suspension
A period of no more than five days during which an employee is to remain
away from his job without pay.
Dismissal
Discharge, [it is] the Department head's decision to dismiss an employee
because of repeated infractions of the rules.
Brief for Appellee at 6, Duldulao, 115 Ill. 2d 482, 505 N.E.2d 314 (No. 62737).
17. Duldulao,115 Ill. 2d at 485, 505 N.E.2d at 315-16. At the start of the day on
December 11, 1981, the Hospital gave Duldulao a "Probationary Evaluation" and a
"Formal Notice" informing her of her termination. Id. Both of the notices listed the
same infractions: "Unsatisfactory performance was demonstrated by the failure to
properly monitor the legal implications of documentation seminar and the patient
education seminar. Further unsatisfactory performance was demonstrated by failure
to follow instructions regarding CPR recertification and monitoring of patient education seminar." Id. Besides the notices issued to Duldulao on the day that she was
terminated, she did not receive any other indication that the Hospital was not satisfied with her job performance. Id.
18. Id. at 484, 505 N.E.2d at 315. Duldulao relied on the terms of the handbook
for the basis of her contractual claim. Id. Duldulao alleged that the Hospital breached
her employment contract by failing to afford her the benefit of the progressive discipline policy as set forth in the handbook before discharging her from her job. Id. at
485, 505 N.E.2d at 316.
19. Duldulao v. Saint Mary of Nazareth Hosp., 136 Ill. App. 3d 763, 483 N.E.2d
956 (1985).
20. Id. at 764, 483 N.E.2d at 957. The trial court found that the only issue was
whether there was bargained for agreement in relation to the handbook. Id. at 764,
483 N.E.2d at 958. (relying on Sargent v. Illinois Inst. of Technology, 78 Ill. App. 3d
117, 397 N.E.2d 443 (1979)). See infra note 32 for a discussion of the Sargent case.
Because there was no evidence that the Hospital and Duldulao bargained for the
handbook, the court concluded that Duldulao did not obtain any special rights from
the handbook. Brief for Appellee at Appendix A, Duldulao, 115 Ill. 2d 482, 505
N.E.2d 314. (No. 62737).

1988]

Duldulao v. St. Mary of Nazareth Hospital

Duldulao was an at will employee and her dismissal was proper."' In
reversing the trial court's decision, the Illinois Appellate Court for
the First District held that the handbook created enforceable contract rights.2 2 The appellate court thus modified the traditional rule
that an employee at Will could be fired at any time with or without
28
cause.
The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's decision. 2' The court specifically addressed the issue of whether an employee handbook could create enforceable contract rights for an otherwise at will employee." The court unanimously concluded that
handbooks may create enforceable contract rights for an at will employee if the contract formation principles of offer, acceptance and
26
consideration are satisfied.
The Duldulao court began its analysis by noting the conflict
that existed among several Illinois appellate courts with respect to
this issue.' For example, the Duldulao court noted that the fifth
district28 held that a handbook creating mutuality of obligations" on
the parties is contractually enforceable.8 0 Next, the Duldulao court
noted that the first district s' held that the promises made in an employee handbook were not binding unless they were "bargained for"
and supported by "independent consideration."8 2 The Duldulao
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Duldulao, 136 Ill. App. 3d at 763, 483 N.E.2d at 958.
Id.
Id.
Duldulao, 115 Ill.
2d at 494, 505 N.E.2d at 320.
Id. at 484, 505 N.E.2d at 315.
Id. at 490, 505 N.E.2d at 318.
Id. at 488, 505 N.E.2d at 317. See also Berendt, Contracts for Employment

at Will, ILL. INST. FOR CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC.

§ 8.9

(1983 & Supp. 1986) (discussing

divergent views of contractual treatment of handbooks prior to Duldulao).
28. Carter v. Kaskaskia Community Action Agency, 24 11. App. 3d 1056, 322
N.E.2d 574 (1974).
29. For a discussion of mutuality of obligations, see infra note 67.
30. Carter, 24 Ill. App. 3d at 1059, 322 N.E.2d at 576. In Carter, the Illinois
Appellate Court for the Fifth District held that an employee manual, adopted after

the employee was hired, was an enforceable agreement. Id.
The employee in Carter had no written contract and there was no evidence of an
oral agreement as to the duration of his employment. Id. at 1058, 322 N.E.2d at 576.
Four years after the employee began working he was issued an employment manual.
Id. The manual contained procedures for grievances, for disciplinary action, and for
dismissal. Id. Because the employee was discharged from his job without the benefit
of the dismissal procedures, the employee sued the employer alleging that he had
been illegally discharged. Id. According to the Carter court, the manual was a modification of an existing at will employment contract. Id. at 1059, 322 N.E.2d at 576. The
Carter court explained that when the employee continued to work after the modification of the contract, he assented to and formed the consideration that created the
mutuality of obligation needed to bind both parties. Id.
31. Sargent v. Illinois Inst. of Technology, 78 111.App. 3d 117, 397 N.E.2d 443
(1979).
32. In Sargent, the first district held that a personnel manual issued by the
employer to the employee was not part of the employment contract. Id. at 122, 397
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court further observed that the second district was in direct conflict
with these holdings."3 The second district had reasoned that an employer who makes promises in an employee handbook should be
bound to those promises regardless of whether the parties bargained
for those promises." ' Although the Duldulao court did not adopt any
one of these views, it recognized the second district's decision as the
"better reasoned approach." '
In addressing the issue of the contractual status of handbooks,
the Duldulao court rejected the general rule that an employee hired
for an indefinite duration is terminable at will with or without
cause.36 The Duldulao court did accept, however, the view that an
37
indefinite hiring creates a presumption of an at will relationship.
Moreover, the Duldulao court added that the employee may rebut
this presumption with evidence that indicates that the parties contracted otherwise.38
N.E.2d at 446. The Sargent court reasoned that the handbook was unenforceable
because the handbook existed when the employee began working, and was not specifically bargained for. Id. at 121-22, 397 N.E.2d at 446.. The Sargent court stated that
an employee handbook is not part of an at will employment contract unless the handbook is a modification of the contract, is bargained for, and is supported by independent consideration. Id. Because the handbook in Sargent did not meet these requirements, the court held that the handbook was not an enforceable contract, but rather
merely a code for the employee's conduct. Id.
33. Duldulao, 115 Ill.
2d at 488, 505 N.E.2d at 317.
34. Kaiser v. Dixon, 127 111.App. 3d 251, 468 N.E.2d 822 (1984). The Kaiser
court rejected the Sargent decision. Id. at 263, 468 N.E.2d at 832. The Kaiser court
held that an employee manual may be binding on the employer, notwithstanding the
fact that it was not "bargained for." Id. at 263, 468 N.E.2d at 831-32. In Kaiser, the
handbook was adopted after the employer began working for the employer. Id. at 263,
468 N.E.2d at 831. The Kaiser court reasoned that because the handbook imposed
obligations on both parties, the best approach is to enforce the handbook as part of
the employment contract. Id. The court stated that such a handbook "cannot be allowed to create rights for employees ... which disintegrate when an employee attempts to exercise them." Id.
35. Duldulao, 115 Ill. 2d at 489, 505 N.E.2d at 317. See supra note 34 and accompanying text for a discussion of the second district's approach in Kaiser. The
Duldulao court also noted that federal courts applying Illinois law have adopted the
second district's approach. Id. See, e.g., Pelizza v. Reader's Digest Sales & Services,
Inc., 624 F. Supp. 806 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (specified procedure for termination and continued employee service binds employer); Kufalk v. Hart, 610 F. Supp. 1178 (N.D. Ill.
1985) (mutuality only requires parties be bound by some consideration); Pudil v.
Smart Buy, Inc. 607 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (private employer bound to handbook promises regardless of bargaining).
It should be noted, however, that at the time that the first district in Duldulao
followed the second district's approach in Kaiser, the Kaiser approach was already
being abandoned. Berendt, supra note 27, § 8.39. For example, in Johnson v. Figgie
Int'l, Inc., 132 Ill. App. 3d 922, 477 N.E.2d 795 (1985), the second district held that
an employee manual could only be enforceable if it was part of a "pre-existing employment agreement." Id. at 927, 477 N.E.2d at 799. Thus, the appellate court confined the previously expansive view it set forth in Kaiser.
36. Duldulao, 115 Ill. 2d at 489, 505 N.E.2d at 317-18.
37. Id. See supra notes 2 and 3 for a discussion of an indefinite hiring as a
presumption of an at will relationship.
38. The Duldulao court interpreted the at will doctrine as a rule of construction
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In determining whether the handbook was in fact a contract,
the Duldulao court adopted the Minnesota Supreme Court's holding
in Pine River State Bank v. Mettille.3 9 In Pine River, the court held
that an employee handbook creates a legally enforceable contract if
three conditions are present."' First, the language of the handbook
must contain a promise sufficiently clear that an employee would
reasonably believe that the employer was making an offer. 41 Second,
the promise must be communicated in such a way that the employee
would reasonably believe it to be an offer.42 Finally, the employee
must accept the offer by continuing to work with knowledge of the
handbook provisions."' According to the Pine River court, when all
three conditions are present, a binding unilateral contract " is
rather than an absolute bar to contractual enforceability. Duldulao, 115 II. 2d at 489,
505 N.E.2d at 318. The majority of jurisdictions dealing with employment relationships treat the at will doctrine as a rule of construction in order to preserve the parties' freedom to contract. E.g., Leikvold v. Valley View Community Hosp., 141 Ariz.
544, 688 P.2d 170 (1984) (court's view that at will doctrine is rule of construction,
rather than one of substance); Touissant v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579,
292 N.W.2d 880 (1980) (doctrine of employment at will is a rule of construction);
Pine River St. Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1982), (employment at will
doctrine as rule of construction is justified on basis of parties' freedom to contract).
39. 333 N.W.2d 622 (1983). In Pine River, the employee alleged that the bank
had breached his employment contract as it was modified by an employee handbook.
Id. at 625. The bank distributed to the employee a handbook containing a provision
entitled "Disciplinary Policy," which stated that "[i]f an employee has violated a
company policy, the following procedure would apply..." Id. at 626. This was followed by a step-by-step process of progressive discipline. Id. The court held that this
constituted a specific offer for a unilateral contract. Id. at 630. The court further held
that by performing his job, the employee both accepted the contract and provided the
necessary consideration for the contract. Id. Thus, the bank's dismissal of the employee without providing him the benefit of the progressive discipline procedure constituted a breach of the employment contract. Id. at 631.
For a critical view of the Pine River decision, see Note, At-Will Employment-Contractual Limitation of an Employer's Right To Terminate: Pine River
State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983), 7 HAMLINE L. REv. 463 (1984).
40. Pine River, 333 N.W.2d at 626-27. The Pine River test requires an objective
examination of the language of the handbook. For example, in Hunt v. IBM Mid
America Employees Fed. Credit Union, 384 N.W.2d 853 (Minn. 1986), the court applied the Pine River analysis and held that when determining whether an offer for a
unilateral contract was made, it must examine the outward manifestations of the parties. Id. at 857. The Hunt court stated that "subjective impressions and assumptions
are not relevant for purposes of ascertaining contractual terms." Id.
41. Pine River, 333 N.W.2d at 626. See also J. CALAMARI & J. PERRILLO, THE
LAW OF CONTRACTS § 2-7 (2d ed. 1977) (distinguishing offers from statements of
intention).
42. Pine River, 333 N.W.2d at 626.
43. Id.
44. A unilateral contract consists of a promise or a group of promises made by
one contracting party that is assented to by performance. J. CALAMARI & J. PERRILLO,
supra note 41, § 4-15. In a unilateral contract, the promisor seeks performance in
exchange for his promise rather than a promise in exchange for his promise. Id. Thus,
the contract is formed when the promisee completes his performance. Id. When the
contract is formed, the promisee earns a right and the promisor is bound. Id. For
example, in Duldulao, the Hospital made a promise to utilize specific pre-termination
procedures in exchange for Duldulao's performance of her job. Duldulao, 115 IlI. 2d
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formed."

Applying the Pine River analysis to Duldulao's situation, the
court found both a binding contract and the Hospital's subsequent
breach.4 6 In reviewing the termination provisions in the handbook,
the court concluded that an employee could reasonably believe that
she would not be terminated without prior warnings. 47 Furthermore,
the court emphasized that the Hospital must have intended that
Duldulao become familiar with the contents of the handbook because her supervisory duties included instructing new employees on
the handbook provisions.' Finally, the court found that when
Duldulao continued to work with knowledge of the contents of the
handbook, she accepted the offer and provided the necessary consid9
eration to form a valid unilateral contract.
Upon reaching its conclusion that a contract was formed, the
Duldulao court went one step further. The court took particular
note of the fact that the handbook contained no disclaimer provisions.8 0 Thus, implicit in the court's observation is the suggestion
that an employer may protect himself from being contractually
bound to the provisions of a handbook when he includes a phrase
that disclaims all of the promises made.5 ' In this case, however, the
employer failed to include a disclaimer.2 Consequently, the court
concluded that an enforceable contract was formed between Duldulao and the Hospital. 3
The Duldulao court justifiably concluded that an employee
handbook, under proper circumstances, may be contractually binding and thus rebut the at will presumption. The decision is correct
for three reasons. First, in adopting the reasoning of Pine River,5
at 490, 505 N.E.2d at 318. At the time Duldulao performed her job, a valid unilateral
contract was formed which bound the Hospital to its promise of the pre-termination
procedures. Id. See generally Pettit, Modern Unilateral Contracts, 63 B.U.L. REV.
551, 559-67 (1983) (discussing widespread use of unilateral contract analysis in employment cases).
45. Pine River, 333 N.W.2d at 627.
46. Duldulao, 115 Ill. 2d at 490, 505 N.E.2d at 318.
47. Id. at 491, 505 N.E.2d at 319.
48. Id. at 492, 505 N.E.2d at 320.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 491, 505 N.E.2d at 319. In fact, the court observed that the handbook
stated the opposite of a disclaimer. Id. A note signed by the president of the Hospital appeared at the beginning of the handbook. Id. The note stated in part: "Please
take the time to become familiar with these policies. They are designed to clarify
your rights and duties as employees. Your observance of these policies will assure
you a respected place in Saint Mary's family of employees." Id. (emphasis added).
51. For a discussion of the effectiveness of disclaimers in the context of employee handbooks, see infra notes 85-89 and accompanying text.
52. Duldulao, 115 Ill. 2d at 491, 505 N.E.2d at 319.
53. Id. at 490, 505 N.E.2d at 318.
54. See supra notes 39-45 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Pine
River case.
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the court appropriately applied a unilateral contract analysis in
evaluating the legal sufficiency of the handbook as a contract.
Through the judicial enforcement of handbooks as contracts, the
courts may accommodate the expectations of both the employer and
the employee. Second, many policy considerations support the
Duldulao court's holding. In particular, the opinion indicates a significant retreat from the harshness of the at will doctrine. Finally,
the decision is correct because it implies that an employer may
avoid liability from handbook promises through the use of simple
disclaimer provisions. As a result, the Duldulao holding will afford
protections to employees without unduly burdening employers.
The Illinois Supreme Court justifiably concluded that an employee handbook with specific grounds for discharge may create enforceable contractual rights to those procedures. 5 In reaching this
conclusion, the Duldulao court appropriately applied a unilateral
contract analysis to determine the legal sufficiency of a handbook as
a contract." By adopting the principles enunciated in Pine River,
the Duldulao court established a precise standard for Illinois courts
to follow when determining whether representations made in an employee handbook provide a basis for a breach of contract action. 57 In
so doing, the supreme court clarified an area of Illinois law wrought
with confusion. 8 Moreover, Illinois joined the overwhelming majority of states that have adopted similar reasoning. 9 Applying the
55. Duldulao, 115 Ill.2d at 490, 505 N.E.2d at 318.
56. Unilateral contract analysis can adequately describe the agreement between
an employer and an employee. The employer-employee relationship is the result of an
agreement between the employer and the employee regarding the terms and conditions of employment. 53 AM. JUR. 2D Master and Servant § 40 (1970). As such, it is
contractual in nature. Id.
57. For the standard that the Duldulao court adopted from Pine River to determine whether a breach of contract action exists, see notes 39-45 and accompanying
text.
58. For a discussion of three Illinois appellate courts with differing views on the
contractual status of handbooks, see supra notes 28, 30, 31, 32 and 34 and accompanying text. See also Ennis v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 582 F. Supp.
876 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (employee handbook is not an enforceable contract but rather a
mere gratuity), aff'd, 795 F.2d 40 (7th Cir. 1986); Piper v. Board of Trustees, 99 Ill.
App. 3d 752, 426 N.E.2d 262 (1981) (employee handbooks will be part of an employment contract if the contract is executed by employee and employer and the written
contract can be construed as subject to the policies of the employer); Note, Employee
Handbooks, supra note 1, at 206 (Illinois is a "state that is a paradigm of the struggle
with the contractual treatment of employee handbooks"); Note, Contract Law: An
Alternative to Tort Law as a Basis for Wrongful Discharge Actions in Illinois, 12
Loy. U. CHi. L.J. 861, 882 (1981) (discussing differing views of handbook
enforceability).
59. See, e.g., Vinyard v. King, 728 F.2d 428 (10th Cir. 1984) (personnel handbook becomes new employment contract when employee continues to perform during
period that handbook was in effect); Lincoln Sterling Drug, Inc., 622 F. Supp. 66
(D.C. Conn. 1985) (handbook will bind private employer if supported by consideration of continued service of employee); Barger v. General Elec. Co., 599 F. Supp. 1154
(W.D. Va. 1984) (employee handbook provisions can be contractual surrender of
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newly established standard, the Duldulao court correctly decided
that a valid unilateral contract was formed when the Hospital issued
its handbook and when Duldulao continued to work under its
provisions.6 0
power to terminate at will); Smith v. Teledyne Indus., Inc., 578 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.
Mich. 1984) (employer contractually bound to documents that outline employment
terms and conditions); Brooks v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 574 F. Supp. 805 (D.
Colo. 1983) (statements made in a manual give rise to enforceable contract rights
where employee relies on manual and continues to work); Leikvold v. Valley View
Community Hosp., 141 Ariz. 544, 688 P.2d 170 (1984) (employer representations
made in handbook construed as implied contract terms if employer encourages reliance); Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981)
(employer's right to terminate not absolute but limited by implied promises); Salimi
v. Farmers Ins. Group, 684 P.2d 264 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984) (employer that distributes
handbooks, if relied upon and supported with consideration by employee, becomes
contractually bound); Magnan v. Anaconda Indus., Inc., 193 Conn. 558, 479 A.2d 781
(1984) (representations may give rise to express or implied contract between the employer and the employee); Jackson v. Minidoka Irrigation Dist., 98 Idaho 330, 563
P.2d 54 (1977) (contractual right to policy is vested when employee continues employment); Wyman v. Osteopathic Hosp. of Maine, Inc., 493 A.2d 330 (Me. 1985)
(handbook can restrict employers' ability to discharge employee, absent good cause);
Staggs v. Blue Cross of Maryland, Inc., 61 Md. App. 381, 486 A.2d 798 (1985) (termination standards contained in handbook can become contractual undertakings if
properly expressed and communicated to employee); Touissant v. Blue Cross-Blue
Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980) (personnel manual that contained "just
cause standard" gave rise to enforceable contract rights); Pine River State Bank v.
Mettille, 333 N.W.2d (Minn. 1983) (court found definite offer by employer and acceptance by employee for termination procedure found in handbook); Enyeart v.
Shelter Mut. Co., 693 S.W.2d 120 (Mo. App. 1985) (handbook gives rise to contractual rights without need for evidence that parties mutually agreed on such contract
rights); Morris v. Lutheran Medical Center, 215 Neb. 677, 340 N.W.2d 388 (1983)
(employer bound to handbook because employer intended to receive benefit of better
employee relations from the handbook); Southwest Gas Corp. v. Ahmad, 99 Nev. 594,
668 P.2d 261 (1983) (employee need only have knowledge of handbook to bind the
employer); Wooley v. Hoffman-LaRouche, Inc., 99 N.J. 284, 491 A.2d 1257 (1985)
(implied promise that employee would only be fired for cause is enforceable where
employee would otherwise be terminable at will); Hernandez v. Home Educ. Livelihood Program, Inc., 98 N.M. 125, 645 P.2d 1381 (1982) (discharge in violation of employer's policy constitutes breach of contract); Bolling v. Clevepak Corp., 20 Ohio
App. 3d 113, 484 N.E.2d 1367 (1984) (employer promulgation of handbook creates
contractual rights that employer may not abridge without incurring liability); Langdon v. Saga Corp., 569 P.2d 524 (Okla. Ct. App. 1976) (employer is bound if employee
relies on articulated personnel policy); Yartzoff v. Democrat-Herald Publishing Co.,
281 Or. 651, 576 P.2d 356 (1978) (handbook given after hiring establishes contractual
rights and guarantees for employee); Osterkamp v. Alkota Mfg., Inc., 332 N.W.2d 275
(S.D. 1983) ("corrective discipline" policy in handbook creates enforceable rights);
Hamby v. Genesco, Inc., 627 S.W.2d 373 (Tenn. App. 1981) (court recognized handbook as part of employment contract); Piacitelli v. Southern Utah State College, 636
P.2d 1063 (Utah 1981) (personnel manual that can be unilaterally modified without
notice obligates employer to observe termination procedures); Thompson v. Saint Regis Paper Co., 102 Wash. 2d 219, 685 P.2d 1081 (1984) (absent disclaimer, employer
creates expectation and obligation that employees will be treated in accordance with
the policies in the handbook); Mobil Coal Prod., Inc. v. Parks, 704 P.2d 702 (Wyo.
1985) (representations made in employment handbook contractually enforceable).
See also Decker, Reinstatement as a Remedy for a Pennsylvania Employer's Breach
of a Handbook or an Employment Policy, 90 DICK. L. REv. 41, 47-52 (1985) (reviewing national status of employee handbooks).
60. Duldulao, 115 Ill. 2d at 490, 505 N.E.2d at 318.
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Through the judicial enforcement of the provisions of employee
handbooks, the reasonable expectations of both the employer and
the employee may be accommodated." An employer who distributes
a handbook does so expecting that he will benefit. 2 Similarly, an
employee who abides by the handbook expects that she will benefit.6" The facts in Duldulao illustrate this point. The Hospital issued
a handbook consisting of nearly fifty pages of dictated policies,"" undoubtedly expecting that they would be followed. 5 Expecting that
the handbook terms would govern her employment relationship,
Duldulao conformed her conduct in accordance with its terms.6 6
When the Duldulao court enforced the handbook as a contract, the
Hospital received the expected benefit of regulating its work force in
accordance with the handbook. At the same time, the court fulfilled
Duldulao's expectation that she would be protected from arbitrary
discharge.
The unilateral contract analysis is particularly appropriate in
the context of handbooks because it relaxes the rigid requirements
of mutuality of obligations6 7 and consideration. 8 In essence, em61. See Reforming At Will Employment, supra note 2, at 455; Note, Continued
Resistance to the Inclusion of Personnel Policies in Contracts of Employment: Griffin v. Housing Authority of Durham, 62 N.C.L. REV. 1326, 1329 (1984) (recognizing
abandonment of strict contract principles to accommodate expectations of parties).
62. See Touissant v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 613, 292 N.W.2d
880, 892 (1980), in which the court emphasized that employers who distribute handbooks presumably expect to benefit from them. See also Note, Employee Handbooks,
supra note 1, at 214 ("employers do not issue handbooks out of altruistic impulses;
they expect to receive some benefit").
63. "Employees do not read and comply with employee handbooks simply because they have warm feelings about their employers; they . . . expect to benefit."
Note, Employee Handbooks, supra note 1, at 214.
64. Brief for Appellee at 11, Duldulao v. Saint Mary of Nazareth Hosp., 115 Ill.
2d 482, 505 N.E.2d 314 (1987) (No. 84-2554).
65. The Hospital contended that the handbook was not intended to create assurances of job security, but rather contained "gratuitous statements of general policy." Brief for Appellee at 8, Duldulao, 115 Ill. 2d 482, 505 N.E.2d 314 (No. 84-2554).
66. When Duldulao conformed her conduct in accordance with the handbook,
she accepted the Hospital's offer. The Second Restatement of Contracts provides
that "an intent to accept is presumed, in the absence of words or conduct to the
contrary, when the act is done with knowledge of the offer." RESTATEMENT (SEcoND)
OF CONTRACTS § 53 comment c (1981).
67. The principle of mutuality of obligations requires that in order for an agreement to be binding, both promises must be binding. CALAMARI, supra note 41, § 4-14.
See also J. MURRAY, MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 90, at 191 (2d ed. 1974) (doctrine of
mutuality is expressed in phrase "both parties are bound or neither is bound"). The
principle of mutuality of obligations in the employment contract results in the conclusion that if an employee is not obligated to continue providing services to an employer, the employer should not be obligated to continue providing employment. See
generally Mauk, supra note 1, at 211-13 (discussing role of mutuality in employment
context).
The unilateral contract approach to employment contracts has abandoned the
requirement of mutuality. This is best illustrated in the case of Touissant v. Blue
Cross-Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 599, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980). In Touissant, the Michigan
Supreme Court rejected the employer's claim that because the handbook was lacking
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ployment at will relationships create unilateral contracts for services
that employees have already performed.6 9 Consequently, it is not
necessary that the employee do anything more than perform her job
to bind the employer.70 Thus, the Duldulao court correctly determined that the detriment an employee suffers by continuing to
in mutuality, it was unenforceable. Id. at 630-31, 292 N.W.2d at 900. The court
stated:
While the defendant's analysis has validity with respect to bilateral contracts
or agreements, we note that the typical employment agreement is unilateral in
nature .... Generally, the employer makes an offer or promise which the employee accepts by performing the act upon which the promise is expressly or
impliedly based ....
[T]here is no contractual requirement that the employee
do more than perform the act upon which the promise is predicated in order to
legally obligate the promisor.
Id.
Courts that evaluate the contractual status of handbooks, according to a unilateral contract analysis, allow a finding of liability on the employer without the need
for a mutual return promise by the employee. See, e.g., Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc.,
57 N.Y.2d 458, 463, 443 N.E.2d 441, 444, 457 N.Y.S.2d 193, 196 (1982) (consideration
is essential to formation of a contract, but mutuality is not); Helle v. Landmark, Inc.,
15 Ohio App. 321, 472 N.E.2d 765, 776 (1984) (mutuality of obligation lacking only
when there is a failure of consideration).
68. Consideration is the inducement to a contract that must exist if a court is to
enforce a promise as a contract. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 6, § 2.2. Simply stated,
consideration is a "detriment incurred by the promisee or a benefit received by the
promisor at the request of the promisor." S.

WILLISTON, WILLISTON ON

CONTRACTS §

102 (1957).
In the context of unilateral contracts, courts have been critical of the rigid requirements of consideration. See, e.g., Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d
311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981). In Pugh, the employee sought damages from being
discharged after 32 years of service for his employer. Id. at 316, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 918.
The employee received assurances that he would not be terminated without good
cause. Id. at 317, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 919. The Pugh court stated that "there is no
analytical reason why an employee's promise to render services, over a period of time
may not support an employer's promise to refrain from arbitrary dismissal." Id. at
325-26, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 925. The court further noted that the requirement of independent consideration is contrary to the general principle that courts should not inquire into the adequacy of consideration. Id. Thus, the Pugh court concluded that the
employee's service was sufficient consideration to bind the employer to the good
cause policy. Id.
69. Comment, Employee Manuals: Contract Rights for At-Will Employees, 58
TEMPLE L.Q. 243, 259-60 (1985) (discussing Wagner v. Sperry Univac, 458 F. Supp
505, 520 (E.D. Pa. 1978)).
70. Various jurisdictions have held that the employee need only continue performing his job to provide the consideration necessary to bind the employer to the
promises that he made in an employee handbook. See, e.g., Gorrill v. Icelandair/
Flugleider, 761 F.2d 847, 852 (2d Cir. 1983) (employee gave adequate consideration to
make handbook binding by continuing to render services after the handbook was issued); Corbin v. Sinclair Mktg., Inc., 684 P.2d 265, 267 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984) (termination provisions in handbook becomes binding contract when the employee's service
is the consideration); Langdon v. Saga Corp., 569 P.2d 524, 527 (Okla. Ct. App. 1976)
(employee's continuation of job and refusal to accept employment elsewhere is sufficient consideration to bind employer to handbook terms). See also Note, Continued
Resistance to the Inclusion of Personnel Policies in Contracts of Employment: Griffin v. Housing Authority of Durham, 62 N.C.L.R. 1326, 1332 (1984) [hereinafter Note,
Continued Resistance] ("an employee has suffered a real detriment in the irretrievable loss of productive years," by continuing to work despite his freedom to leave)
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work, though free to leave, is sufficient consideration to form a uni71
lateral contract.
In addition to contract principles, there are also many policy
considerations that support the Duldulao decision. First, recognizing
handbooks as enforceable contracts limits the harshness of the at

will doctrine.7 Typically, the high costs of negotiating for individual
contract rights prevents parties from establishing specific employment contracts." Consequently, employees accept standard at will
contracts.7 4 Although individual bargaining may be inefficient, at
will contracts strip employees of their bargaining power. 7 ' When
courts construe handbooks as contracts, the employee gains valuable
contract rights and the expense of negotiation is eliminated.
In effect, the Duldulao decision will benefit employees because
it will force employers to accurately define the terms and conditions
of employment.7 s The employees, in turn, will be more satisfied in
their jobs because they will have a clearer understanding of the
terms of their employment.7 Enhanced employee satisfaction results in increased productivity and a more effective work force. 7 ' Additionally, employee morale will improve if the employer is bound to
handbook provisions because the perceptions of employer unfairness
71. It is well established that forebearance in reliance on a unilateral promise is
sufficient consideration to enforce a contract. 1 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §
137, at 585 (1963); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND).OF CONTRACTS § 80 comment a
(1981) (single performance sufficient consideration for number of promises).
72. The harshness of the at will doctrine has been the subject of much criticism
recently. For a lengthy compilation of articles written with criticism towards the at
will doctrine, see Decker, supra note 1, at 209 n.3. See also Harrison, The "New"
Terminable-at-Will Employment Contract: An Interest and Cost Incidence Analysis, 69 IOWA L. REV. 327, 331 (1984) (suggesting erosion of doctrine shifts costs to
employees which results in lower wages and fewer employment opportunities); Wald
& Wolf, Recent Developments in Employment at Will, 1 LAB. LAW. 533, 555-79
(1985) (state-by-state profile of exceptions to at will doctrine).
73. Note, Protecting At Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The
Duty to Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1816, 1830 (1980) [hereinafter Note, Duty to Terminate].
74. See Note, Continued Resistance, supra note 70, at 1329 (discussion of the
high costs of negotiation forcing employees to accept at will contracts).
75. Compare Marrinan, Employment at Will: Pandora'sBox May Have an Attractive Cover, 7 HAMLINE L. REV. 155, 192 (1984) (author advocates judicial intervention to redress imbalance of bargaining power between an employer and employee)
with Note, Duty to Terminate, supra note 73, at 1833-35 (author criticizes changing
the parties' relative bargaining power through judicial intervention).
76. See Marrinan, supra note 75, at 200 (urging legislation to establish clear
standards, uniformity, predictability and stability to employment relationships); Harrison, supra note 72, at 134 ("[a]chieving some measure of certainty with regard to
employers' and employees' rights and duties is important").
77. See PERRiTr, supra note 1, § 8.4 (system of rules needed to fully utilize
energies of workforce).
78. See Touissant v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 591, 292 N.W.2d
880, 892 (1980), wherein the court stated that the employer "secures an orderly, cooperative and loyal work force" from an established set of work policies.
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will be reduced.7 9 Thus, the Duldulao decision may decrease the
amount of litigation arising from employment terminations. 0
The Duldulao decision also promotes fairness in the employment relationship. A successful employment relationship cannot be
based on illusory promises" or unenforceable expectations. An employer should not make promises in an employee handbook unless
he intends them to be binding. 2 Because Duldulao abided by the
handbook, fairness dictates that the Hospital also must abide by the
terms of the handbook."
Finally, in addition to providing advantages for employees, the
Duldulao decision does not unduly burden employers. The court
suggested that it may have decided the case differently if the Hospital had included a disclaimer provision to negate the promises made
in the handbook.8 4 Consequently, despite an employer's increased
vulnerability in the context of employee handbooks, an employer
may limit his legal exposure merely by including a disclaimer. 85 Be79. PERRi-r, supra note 1, § 8.6. Perritt stated that handbook and employment
policies may increase employee morale by reducing the opportunity for arbitrary supervisory action. Id.
80. See generally Meyerowitz, Save Your Business Client From a Wrongful
Discharge Suit, 71 A.B.A. J. 66, 68 (1985) (advising employers on drafting handbooks
to limit risk of potential wrongful discharge litigation); Note, Reforming At Will Employment Law: A Model Statute, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 370, 393 (1983) (author suggests decrease in litigation through binding parties to handbook provisions).
81. "If performance of the promise is at the uncontrolled discretion of the
promisor and the promisor cannot be said to have surrendered his free will, the promise is deemed to be illusory-a false obligation." M. CLOSEN, R. PERLMUTrER & J.
WITTENBERG, CONTRACTS: CONTEMPORARY CASES, COMMENTS & PROBLEMS 1, 142 (1984)
(citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 76 & 77 (1968)).
82. For a view that disagrees with this position, see Comment, Judicial Limitation of the Employment at-Will Doctrine, 54 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 552, 573 (1980) (contending that contract cause of action is ineffective remedy for protecting employees).
83. See Hammond v. North Dakota State Personnel Bd., 345 N.W.2d 359, 361
(N.D. 1984) (because employment manuals are published by employers, employers
must be accountable under the provisions established in the manual); DeFrank v.
County of Greene, 412 A.2d 663, 667 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1980) (fundamental fairness
dictates that employer be bound to the handbook provisions); Note, The Employment Handbook as a ContractualLimitation on the Employment At Will Doctrine,
31 VILL. L. REV. 335, 374 (1986) ("the purpose of imposing contractual liability is not
to create new rights for employees, but merely to ensure fairness in the employment
relationship").
84. Duldulao, 115 Ill. 2d at 491, 505 N.E.2d at 319.
85. A disclaimer provision regarding job security provisions set forth in an employee handbook gains additional weight when determining whether a cause of action
for wrongful discharge exists. Labor Letter, Wall St. J., July 30, 1985, at 1, col. 5. For
examples of suggested disclaimers that an employer could use in handbooks, see J.
BARBASH, J. FEERICK & J. KAUFF, UNJUST DISMISSAL AND AT WILL EMPLOYMENT 116-17
(1982); M. SAUTTER, EMPLOYMENT IN ILLINOIS-A GUIDE TO EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES
AND REGULATIONS § 12-12, at 208 (1986); P. WEINER, S. BOMPEY & M. BRIrrAIN,
WRONGFUL DISCHARGE CLAIMS: A PREVENTIVE APPROACH 96-98, 138-141 (1986). See
also DeGiuseppe, The Effect of the Employment at Will Rule on Employee Rights to
Job Security and Fringe Benefits, 10 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1, 54 (1981). The author of
the article stated that the crucial language of a disclaimer clearly indicates that "the
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cause a handbook must contain a clear indication that a promise was
made,8 s a handbook containing a disclaimer would not create an enforceable contract.87 If an employer issued a handbook containing an
explicit disclaimer, employees would have no reasonable expectation
of a promise.88 Furthermore, an employee could not reasonably rely
on a handbook specifically stating that it was not meant to be relied
upon. 8 The Duldulao decision, therefore, provides protections for
employees without imposing any concomitant burdens on the
employer.
In Duldulao,9 0 the Illinois Supreme Court recognized an exception to the at will employment doctrine. The court held that the
provisions of an employee handbook will create enforceable contract
rights when the formation principles of a unilateral contract are
met. The decision is well founded in principles of contract, as well as
in various policy considerations. Through the judicial enforcement
of handbook provisions, the employment relationship will achieve
certainty and predictability, both of which are vital to the employment relationship. Additionally, the court's recognition that there is
employer in question was not making an offer to contract, that the terms of the handbook in question could be changed at any time and for any reason with or without
notice at the management's discretion, and that the employees under these policies
did not have any vested rights." Id.
Employers should beware, however, that a disclaimer provision may be deemed
unconscionable where the handbook imposes obligations on the employer, yet specifically states that the handbook is not to be construed as part of the employment contract. See generally J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERICAL CODE § 4-2 (2d
ed. 1980) (doctrine of unconscionability protects disadvantaged party in a one-sided
bargain). For example, in Schipani v. Ford Motor Co., 102 Mich. App. 606, 302
N.W.2d 307 (1981), the court disregarded a disclaimer that reserved the right to terminate the employee at any time because the handbook contained assurances of fair
treatment in termination.
86. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text for a discussion of the requirements for the contractual enforceability of a handbook.
87. E.g., Reid v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 790 F.2d 453, 461 (6th Cir. 1986) (clear
expression negating element of offer disposes of contract issue).
88. A handbook, which contains an express clause that an employee remains
terminable at will, would arguably put the employee on notice that he may be terminated at any time, irrespective of contrary provisions in a handbook. Note, Duty to
Terminate, supra note 73, at 1833 n.91. See, e.g., Castiglione v. Johns Hopkins Hosp.,
69 Md. App. 325, 517 A.2d 786 (1986). Based on an express disclaimer clause contained in the handbook, the Castiglione court determined that there was no legally
binding contract of employment. Id. at 340, 517 A.2d at 793. Accord Ward v. Berry &
Assocs., Inc., 614 S.W. 2d 372, 374 (Tenn. App. 1981). But cf. Helle v. Landmark,
Inc., 15 Ohio App. 3d 1, 8-9, 472 N.E.2d 765, 773 (1984) (oral promises can render
disclaimer ineffective).
89. Another theory of recovery for employees is based on section 90 of the Second Restatement of Contracts. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981).
Section 90 states that a promisor, who makes a promise that he should reasonably
expect to induce action or forebearance on the part of the promisee, is bound by that
promise if it does induce such action or forebearance. Id. The crucial element of section 90 is that the promisor reasonably expected to induce reliance. See id.A handbook displaying an express disclaimer would not induce such reliance.
90. 115 Ill. 2d 482, 505 N.E.2d 314 (1987).
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a limitation to handbook enforceability when the employer includes
a disclaimer decreases the potential for employer liability. The
Duldulao decision thus provides a practical solution for protecting
employees without imposing any undue burdens on employers. Future cases will determine whether Duldulao is truly an employee
benefit.9 1
Jill P. O'Brien

91. While the Duldulao decision significantly clarifies this area of the law, there
are many questions left unresolved. See Wilner & Sheehan, Employment At Will
Doctrine in Illinois: The Effect of Employee Handbooks, 76 ILL. B.J. 268, 273 (1988).
For example, the court did not specify whether Illinois courts would recognize an
action for negligent performance of an employment contract. Id. In addition, it is
unclear what type of recovery would be awarded based on breach of progressive discipline policies when there is just cause for the employee's termination. Id. Other such
unresolved issues include whether the Duldulao decision would extend to situations
where a recruiter may have made statements regarding job security to prospective
employees. See Lopatka, The Emerging Law of Wrongful Discharge-A Quadrennial
Assessment of the Labor Law Issue of the 80s, 40 Bus. LAW. 30 (1984) (advising use
of disclaimer in recruiting situations).

